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INTRODUCTION
Prejudice implanted or stimulated in the minds of jurors wins
criminal trials. To the extent of their personal feelings about its
effectiveness and ethics, both prosecutor and defense counsel use
it.'
The observing juror soon learns that the influence of
prejudice must be given attention in every trial at law. It is
always present. It is in the jury and must all the time be
considered by the jury as affecting in some degree every
participant in trial. Any element of proof may be affected
by prejudice. This influence must be guarded against by all
who give testimony and all who hear testimony....
Experience teaches that not every case is decided on the
evidence. Prejudice may be a thirteenth juror that controls
the decision. . . . Next to perjury, prejudice, as taken ad-
vantage of by the unworthy and as fostered and utilized where
bad legal methods prevail, is the main cause of miscarriages
of justice.- [emphasis added].
Unfortunately, the destructive forces of prejudice are easily
activated. The sophisticated trial attorney can pose questions
with such suggestive language and intonation that the jury is
prejudicially impressed despite any answer a witness might give.'
Even knowing that certain evidence or testimony will probably
be excluded by the court, an attorney may be inclined to use it.
He can reveal its existence to the jury in such a fashion that the
offer itself foreshadows the injurious content.4 In either instance
opposing counsel is faced with a tactical dilemma. If he objects
to the proceedings then he may only fix the jury's rapt attention
upon the material which he seeks to obliterate from the record
and their minds. Once aroused, the jurors may form the impression
that objecting counsel's client has something to hide as it appears
that he is attempting to prevent them from obtaining full infor-
' See generally Armstrong, Objections to Evidence in Jury Trials: A Multiple
Review, 23 TENN. L. REv. 943 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Armstrong]; Note, Im-
proper Argument to Juries in Civil Cases, 43 MwN. L. REv. 545 (1959).
2 A. Osnomr, THE Mnm oF Tm JutoR, 87, 92 (1937).
3 Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1089 (1937).
4 Love, Pretrial Exclusionary Evidence Ruling, 1967 Wis. L. Rv. 738 [here-
inafter cited as Love].
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mation and considering evidence which seems logically pertinent.5
The traditional "curative" actions taken by the trial judge are
not only ineffective and unrealistic, but may actually aggravate
the potential harm." Like the objection, a favorable ruling may
further emphasize the sensitive inferences. When the court sus-
tains counsel's objection, instructions to disregard the evidence
and not to draw inferences or speculate about the content of
excluded exhibits are typically given both at the time of the ruling
and at the conclusion of the case. For the juror who is anything
less than a mental gymnast, these repetitive admonitions may
further entrench the prejudicial content of the non-evidence.7
On the other hand, an attorney may elect to avoid heightening
the significance of the injurious material by not objecting at all.
However, then the issue of prejudice may be waived and lost for
appeal purposes by the failure to offer timely resistence in the
trial court.8 Thus, whether counsel actively resists or passively
ignores prejudicial issues as they are raised before the jury, his
client may suffer irreparable legal injury. The "motion in liminie"
offers some potential for encouraging just jury deliberations by
isolating prejudice in criminal trials. Because the burden of
proof falls primarily on the state in criminal matters, the major
advantage in employing motions in liminie will devolve to defense
counsel. Yet in many instances, the prosecutor too will be able to
employ this new technique.
I. MOTION IN Lqn=m DEFnqi
The motion in liminie is a procedural device which requests
a pretrial order enjoining opposing counsel from using certain
prejudicial evidence in front of the jury at a later trial. Although
it is also referred to as a "motion to exclude" and a "motion to
suppress", this motion should be distinguished from certain other
well established pretrial procedures which assert that items of
evidence or confessions were illegally obtained and therefore
inadmissable at trial under constitutional doctrines. The true
5 I. GoL~srmN, TR AL TECHNQUE, § 422, at 355 (1935); Davis, The Motion
In Liminie-A Neglected Trial Technique, 5 WAsHBuRN L.J. 232, 233 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Davis] and 15 Crv.-MAl. L. REv. 255, 256 (1966).
6 Armstrong, supra note 1, at 555-60.
7Id. at 558-59; Rice v. United States, 149 F.2d 601, 604 (10th Cir. 1945).
8 Armstrong, supra note 1, at 560-61.
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motion in liminie requests only an evidentiary ruling that the
characteristics of a particular piece of evidence give it potentially
inflamatory aspects which appear to outweigh whatever ma-
teriality it could have at trial. Because of the existence of this
severe possibility of irreparable prejudice, the court is generally
requested to order that the evidence should not be offered at
trial in the presence of the jury, without first obtaining the judge's
permission. The motion therefore becomes a procedural device
for insulating the jury from the very mention of prejudicial
topics.
II. SouRCEs OF AUTHoErY
Initially, counsel must consider that the concept of enter-
taining evidentiary rulings prior to the beginning of trial runs,
somewhat counter to traditional Anglo-American legal thought.9
Any objection made at a point prior to the time that evidence
is actually offered during trial is widely regarded as premature.
Some authorities feel that only at trial does the judge have a
sufficient view of the entire case to properly rule on the admission
or exclusion of evidence. Therefore, in urging the adoption of a
novel procedural technique, counsel should be prepared to cite
authority which validates the concept of pretrial exclusionary
rulings. To date no jurisdiction has adopted an express statute or
rule recognizing motions in liminie. However, it can be argued
that the general catchall provisions of rules authorizing pretrial
conferences and orders contemplate the type of "coercive rulings"
required by a motion in liminie. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
16 and its progeny can be so construed. 10 Counsel should check
the statutes and rules of his own jurisdiction for like support.
Even those courts which have held that their own compre-
hensive statutory scheme prohibits considering motions in limi-
nie on certain matters, have recognized that a judge has the
inherent and discretionary power to consider some pretrial
evidentiary exclusions.'1 This will be the basic argument in most
situations. The power to consider a motion in liminie and make
9 Herr, The Evidence Ruling at Pretrial in the Federal Courts, 54 CAL. L. REV.
1016, 1022 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Herr].
10 Id. at 1017-22; but see Love, supra note 4, at 748-50.
11 State v. Hawthorne, 228 A.2d 682, 688 (N.J. 1967).
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pretrial exclusionary rulings is inherent in the judge's authority
to admit or exclude evidence and to take such precautions as are
necessary to affard a fair jury trial to all parties.12 In addition
those rationales that have been used to justify judicial innovation
and rulings in pretrial conferences, motions for summary judg-
ment, and motions to suppress can be used to legitimize the in
liminie Process."
Counsel can also make persuasive arguments from the limited
body of case law precedents which have developed. Although
counsel's motion in liminie was rejected therein, the landmark
"attempt" appears to be Bradford v. Birmingham Electric Com-
pany.'4 The earliest reported criminal motion in liminie seems to
be the defense maneuver in State v. Smith."5 Some of the criminal
precedents are referred to in the several law review discussions
on motions in liminie and in an annotation, 16 and most of them are
collected later in this article. Even the unfavorable decisions
should be of use to inventive counsel, because in some instances
the motion in liminie was rejected on grounds that careful drafting
and proper argument might overcome.
III. TYPEs OF MonoNs iN LDmNiE
Depending upon the language used and the type of pre-trial
order sought from the court, a motion in liminie may be either
"prohibitive-absolute," "prohibitive-preliminary," or "permissive."
A. The Prohibitive Order
It is the "prohibitive order" which is best developed and most
used in criminal matters. Basically, with this device the attorney
seeks a court order prohibiting the offering of certain prejudicial
evidence to the jury.
Counsel may ask the judge to make the pretrial exclusion in
either "absolute" or a "preliminary" form. The preliminary order
12 Davis, supra note 5, at 234 and 15 Cinv.-Mn. L. REv., supra note 5,
at 257; Kromzer, Advantages to be Gained by Trial Motions for the Plaintiff 6 So.
TEx. L.J. 178, 179 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kromzer]; see generally McCoR-
mm;icw, HANDBOOK or = LAW OF EVIDENCE, Title 6, Relevancy and Its Counter-
weights: Time, Prejudice, Confusion, and Surprise, at 314-343 (1954).
Is See Love, supra note 4, at 746.
14 149 So. 729 (Ala. 1933).
15 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937).
16 Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087 (1963).
1972.]
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states that a party is prohibited from making or discussing the
prejudicial proof in front of the jury, but may still offer the
evidence at trial if the matter is brought up first with the court
in chambers. The absolute order prohibits a party from offering
or mentioning the offending evidence at trial in any way. It is, in
fact and in effect, a final ruling of "inadmissability." Model drafts
for both absolute and preliminary types of prohibitive motions
in liminie are included in the appendix as Forms 1 and 2,
respectively.
Most proponents of the motion in liminie favor the use of the
preliminary prohibition rather than the final order.17 As many
judges are still reluctant to make pre-trial evidence rulings that
are not specifically sanctioned by rule or statute, the tentative
phraseology makes the preliminary motion more palatable. It
also appeals to the judicial sense of fairness to leave open the
possibility that prejudicial evidence may be used if it becomes
proper and necessary during the trial to re-establish an equality
of advantage with the jury. But most importantly, the use of a
preliminary order prevents the creation of built-in reversable
error. If the evidence which is excluded on pretrial motion as
"prejudicial" later becomes legally relevant and material, then
the party who originally wanted to use it may have an automatic
ground for appeal built into his case, whereas a final order pro-
hibits him from offering his evidence under any circumstances.18
However, if the order is only "preliminary", the same party must
take affimative steps to argue that the once "prejudicial" evidence
is now relevant and to make an offer to the court outside the
jury's presence in order to preserve his grounds for appeal.
The preliminary order has minor drawbacks, however. The
preliminary order, because of its tentative nature, may be viewed
as an improper, advisory opinion in those jurisdictions which
prohibit the judiciary from ruling on all but final questions.
Where the preliminary order is employed, a party who urges
the use of the suspect evidence has both the opportunity to ad-
vance his arguments twice, and the opportunity to strengthen his
second presentation by additional research and strategy before
trial. Despite these disadvantages, the "preliminary" form is
17 Kxomzer, supra note 12, at 185-186.
18 Id.
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clearly the more advantageous type of prohibitive motion in
liminie.
B. The Permissive Order
There is no reported precedent for a pretrial motion which
would have contested evidence declared "admissible". 9 Never-
theless, the motion in liminie procedure easily lends itself to the
prosecutor or defendant who wishes to avoid committing revers-
able error at trial by submitting a possible prejudicial strategy
or piece of evidence to prior judicial scrutiny. In this way, the
moving party can avoid allegations of surprise and formally seek
court advice on how a delicate issue might best be controlled at
trial to avoid both mistrial and new trial on appeal. An example
of the "permissive" type of motion in liminie will be found in the
Appendix, as Form 8.
IV. MonoN IN LvINIE OBJEcrrvEs
The proper use of a motion in liminie contemplates the
achievement and interrelation of five objectives:
A. Isolation of the Prejudicial Evidence From the jury
First, and foremost, the motion must be employed to accom-
plish the primary purpose of preserving neutrality in the mental
processes of the jury by preventing any trial references to the
injurious material. Counsel should anticipate prejudice in as
many areas and by as many tactics as can possibly damage his
position, and make his attempts to suppress correspondingly.
B. Maximum Discovery
The motion in liminie can be used as a probe to determine
the specifics of any part of opposing counsel's case that can be
hypothecated to contain potentially prejudicial evidence. By
directing a pretrial prejudice attack toward a sensitive area, an
adversary can be forced to disclose not only what evidence he
has, but also the rationales and theories upon which he intends
to proceed at trial to make that evidence material and relevant
to his case.
:9 Herr, supra note 9, at 1024.
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C. Force Opponent Elections
Because the opportunity to present certain evidence during
trial may be foreclosed by a motion in liminie, the opposing
attorney is forced to make evaluations and elections. Depending
upon the strength of his entire case, a decision not to resist the
motion and not to use the prejudicial evidence at trial may spring
from a sense of "fair play". Or the attorney may become so
aggressive and insistent about his right to use the prejudicial
evidence, that he conmits reversable error at trial with material
that he otherwise might not have offered. Any explanation of
the basis and relevancy for which the contested evidence will be
offered can be considered a limiting commitment, regardless of
which way the judge rules on the pretrial motion. Any use of
that evidence for other purposes by the opposition will give
counsel an opportunity to advance the argument of unfair sur-
prise, and a chance to re-present his contentions of prejudice.
D. Preserve Record for Appeal
Again, whichever way the court rules, the attorney urging
prejudice is in a much stronger position when he initiates his
resistence through pretrial motion in liminie. A favorable pro-
hibitive order will indicate that a trial level judge felt that the
evidence was so strongly inflamatory that its very mention should
have been suppressed to insure fairness at trial. Any direct or
indirect violation of the order thus becomes more persuasively
reversable error. Or if his motion was denied, counsel can argue
that the trial was tainted from the start by the implicit permission
of the trial judge to parade prejudice in front of the jury. That
a potential for prejudice should be recognized well before the
trial began further strengthens the position that it should be
regarded as reversable error.
E. Obtain Favorable Guilty Plea Offers
Both the prosecution and defense can use success in a motion
in liminie to persuade the opposition to accede to a guilty plea
on terms more favorable than the prevailing party might other-
wise be able to demand before trial. The defendant who knows
that prejudicial evidence will probably be offered against him will
consider pleading to a higher than normal sentence to avoid
unfavorable jury reactions at a trial. The defendant who has
[Vol. 60
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successfully shown the prosecution that some of the state's evi-
dence may be inadmissibly prejudicial is in a strong position to
demand favorable plea bargaining terms.
V. STRATEGY IN OFFERING
Keeping in mind his basic objectives, the attorney should
isolate the potential prejudicial issues that he may face under
the facts of his case. A shotgun approach is not advised. The
motion has the greatest chance of success if it attacks a limited
number of items, all of which would be reasonably prejudicial
and not merely harmful to the case. Unless the movant can show
a reasonable basis which compels this unusual pretrial ruling, it
is the feeling of experienced trial attorneys that the judge will
be inclined to reject the motion.2 0 To include items of evidence
that will not truly create prejudice if offered will give opposing
counsel additional ammunition for his argument that trial evi-
dence should not be restricted by a pretrial ruling. In cases
where a large number of potentially prejudicial issues exist, the
attorney may wish to include in his motion only the most complex,
and those which present the greatest threat of causing delay
during trial. Only issues which must be decided before trial to
preserve the essential fairness of the proceedings should be raised
by motion in liminie.21
Counsel should also consider whether the peculiar circum-
stances of his case make "permissive" or "absolute" forms of the
motion more desirable than the typically sought "preliminary-
prohibitive" order. If he has evidence which emphatically refutes
the opposition's prejudicial material or places it in a proper
perspective, the attorney may wish to seek a "permissive" order
from the court to allow his offer if the opposition introduces its
evidence at trial. If the attorney is convinced that any oral
objection whatsoever to the prejudicial material will condemn
his cause before the jury, he may wish to move for an order in
"absolute" form. Counsel may then gamble by relying on built-in
error if his motion is denied. However, absent any special cir-
cumstances, the "preliminary-prohibitive" order should be sought.
20 Krornzer, supra note 12, at 185.
21 Id. at 185; Love, supra note 4, at 751.
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The attorney must also be very careful in drafting the language
of the motion and order. The terminology must be general
enough to prohibit the opposing party from invoking the same
prejudice in a roundabout manner, yet at the same time specific
enough to warn the opposition of tactics and references which
will not be permitted.2 2 However, it is not necessary that the
order be overly formal or all inclusive to be used as the basis for
an appeal.
Counsel should also be careful not to strengthen the case
against himself by indiscreet use of the motion in liminie. Over-
broad attacks may suggest the availability of types of evidence
that the opposition had not previously contemplated using or
understood to be available. Opposing counsel may feel compelled
to resist the motion and thereby commit himself to use evidence
at trial that he otherwise would not have presented. The attorney
should also avoid the tendency to neglect other well established
pretrial motions which ultimately may be of greater value to the
client's cause if properly pursued.
The timing of the offer of a motion in liminie can be important
in advancing counsel's cause. The motion in liminie should be
presented as part of a coordinated pattern of preliminary maneu-
vers, and might be combined with one or more other pretrial
motions. However, care must be taken to preserve the idea that
the threat of prejudice is so significant that it merits the court's
separate and well-considered pretrial ruling. A motion offered
well before trial may catch the opposition off-guard and relatively
unprepared to argue that a particular piece of evidence is relevant
and necessary to its case. A "preliminary" motion offered too
early may give opposing counsel more than enough time to
research and restructure his case in such a way that the once
"prejudicial evidence" can be given a posture of legal relevancy
which requires its admission. For the attorney who is interested
in obtaining a favorable guilty plea opportunity, the motion should
be offered or threatened at the time when the attorney would
ordinarily begin negotiation.
Where it appears to counsel before trial that his motion in
liminie is about to be rejected by the judge, he may suggest several
22State v. Morgan, 73 P.2d 745 (Wash. 1937); Bridge v. City of Richardson,
349 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. 1961), aff'd, 854 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1962).
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alternatives to the court. If the court feels compelled to deny
the motion, counsel might request that it be done without prej-
udice to represent it at a later time. Or if the court seems to be
unimpressed with the need for making pretrial evidentiary rul-
ings, counsel might ask the trial judge to defer a ruling until trial,
subject to the stipulation that the evidence shall then be first
presented outside the jury's presence. The moving attorney
could also request that if the motion is denied, opposing counsel
be required to submit a list of proposed questions in the sensitive
area so that the prejudice and surprise might be fairly answered
at trial.
VI. LNrr_4L SHOWING REQuIm
Counsel must consider the type of evidence he seeks to
exclude by a "prohibitive" motion in liminie and place it into one
of two classes.
Material That Would Be Inadmissable At Trial Under Estab-
lished Rules Of Evidence, And The Mere Offer Of Which Before
The Jury Will Create Prejudice
The attorney in this situation is facing tangible evidence or
testimony which clearly would be inadmissable if offered during
trial under evidentiary rules such as those on hearsay, best
evidence, or privileged communications. But he cannot wait
until trial to voice his objection if he wishes to avoid poisoning
the jurors' minds with the prejudice. Counsel must direct the
court's attention to a particular rule of evidence under which
the suspect material would be inadmissable at trial for the par-
ticular purpose opposing counsel intends to use it. Any exclu-
sionary rule recognized in the jurisdiction can be used. Then
counsel must show that the prejudice which naturally flows from
the mere mention of this evidence requires that an initial ruling
on its admissability be made away from the jury. Because the
rules of evidence are relatively fixed, the attorney can argue
that the judge's ruling will not generally be affected by the
circumstances of the trial, as a definite rule requiring the exclusion
of the evidence. Little or no balancing of interests is involved.
All counsel requests is an ordinary exclusionary ruling based
solely on established rules of evidence, but made in advance of
trial to eliminate a potentially unfair situation.
1972]
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Material, The Minor Relevance Of Which Is Outweighed By
Its Potentially Prejudicial Effect On The fury
"Logical relevancy" means that an item of evidence tends to
establish a proposition for which it is offered to prove.23 But at
trial the judge must be concerned with the overall 'legal rel-
evancy" of a particular piece of evidence. It must have sufficient
probative value to shed some light on the subjects under inquiry
and be prima facie admissible. 24 To the extent possible, counsel
should argue that the prejudicial evidence is not relevant to any
material issues in the case and should therefore be excluded.
However, most of the prejudicial evidence that counsel is able
to anticipate during the pretrial stages will probably have some
logical and legal relevance.
But relevance is not always enough. There may remain
the question, is its value worth what it costs? There are
several counterbalancing factors which may move the court
to exclude relevant circumstantial evidence if they outweigh
its probative value. In order of their importance, they are
these. First, the danger that the facts offered may unduly
arouse the jury's emotions of prejudice, hostility, or sympathy.
Second, the probability that the proof and answering evidence
that it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly dis-
tract the jury from the main issues. Third, the likelihood that
the evidence offered and the counter proof will consume an
undue amount of time. Fourth, the danger of unfair surprise
to the opponent when, having no reasonable ground to antici-
pate this development of the proof, he would be unprepared
to meet it.2
5
Counsel should concentrate his attack in those areas. Obvi-
ously, the trial judge will always be in the best position to balance
the intangibles of probative value and prejudice as they exist at
the point in time when the evidence is finally offered. Therefore
the attorney in making a motion in liminie must argue that the
probable dangers of the evidence he seeks to exclude will out-
weigh its probative value in every circumstance which might
develop at trial. Although this balancing is done of necessity on
23 McCoRmicK, supra note 12, at 315.
241d. at 319.
25 Id. at 319-320 (footnotes omitted).
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a case by case, item by item basis, there are certain areas in
which litigation has developed firm rules of precedent regarding
the relevance of prejudicial evidence.26 Where these decisions
hold certain types of evidence inadmissable in a given situation,
they may be used in the same fashion as are the formal exclu-
sionary rules of evidence for the first type of material. Outside
their controlling jurisdictions these rulings can be cited as per-
suasive authority in such matters as proof of character, other
crimes, personal habits, or prior convictions.
An explanation of the following elements should be made
in support of every motion in liminie:
(1) Reasons that indicate that the case is ready for and will
be proceeding to trial.
(2) What the basic, relevant issues will be judging from the
general nature and specific circumstances of the case.
(3) That opposing counsel's conduct to date and other dis-
covered facts suggest that it is eminently probable, not merely
speculative, that a presentation of the contested evidence at trial
is intended.
(4) What specific content, items, and inferences are sought
to be excluded, and the specific ways in which any reference
will inflame the passion, prejudice, hostility, sympathy or illogic
of the jury, cause confusion, or consume an inordinate amount of
time.
(5) The respects in which this foreseeable jury reaction will
result to the detriment of the moving party's right to a fair trial.
(6) That the certain matter or testimony is:
(a) Inadmissible under the exclusionary rules of evidence
and to permit its offer at trial will raise the specified prejudice;
or
(b) Of such minor legal relevance that the jury prejudice
it will create either outweighs its probative value or places
it in a class of prejudicial evidence that has been ruled
generally inadmissable by the courts.
(7) That to delay hearing the objection until the contested
matter is mentioned, shown, or offered in front of the jury would
26 Id. at 820; Love, supra note 4, at 752.
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permit the prejudicial effects to be felt by the jurors and endanger
a fair trial.
(8) That therefore, the granting of the movant's motion in
liminie, to absolutely exclude the evidence, or preliminarily
require that any offer be brought up first with the court alone,
is an appropriate method of preserving the fairness of the trial
and isolating the jury from prejudice.
If counsel is seeking a "permissive" order to have the court
endorse and control what might otherwise be a reversably im-
proper procedure which he contemplates making at trial, his
arguments will be similar. He should outline the specific tactic
that he wishes to employ and explain the reasons that compel its
use. The attorney should then cite whatever rules or precedents
hold that the procedure he proposes is improper, and examine
the rationales behind them. Even if no rules exist, counsel should
examine the sources of potential prejudice to the opposition and
suggest how the injurious features might be minimized. Sum-
marizing his contention that the particular need in this case for
the unusual evidence or procedure outweighs the reasons requir-
ing exclusion in ordinary circumstances, the attorney should
plead that fairness demands that he be permitted to employ his
tactic under court-supervised conditions.
VII. PossIBLE ExcLusIoNARY AREAs IN CmmwiAL TmALs
Most of the recent development which motion in liminie
practice has experienced has been confined to the field of civil
practice. But by analogy from those cases, and from the few
criminal precedents, the attorney can observe certain areas in
which motions in liminie are appropriate. Although the holdings
in some of the cases have been against using pretrial exclusions,
other cases have endorsed the practice as appropriately suited to
the needs of modern criminal justice. The following is a checklist
of exclusionary areas toward which the motion in liminie and
related motions might be directed in criminal trials, with both
favorable and unfavorable criminal precedent noted where ap-
plicable. A few civil cases are also included. The guideline is
not offered or intended as all-inclusive. Only the inventiveness
of counsel will limit the number of areas in which the motion in
liminie may be legitimately applied.
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A. Pleadings
The defendant can move to expunge unnecessary allegations
in the indictment or complaint which might permit the admission
of improper evidence. In a civil case, Morico v. Cox, 27 the failure
of the trial court to expunge was not regarded as reversible error.
B. Status of Defendant or Witness
1. Drug addiction, alcoholism, violence, or personal habits-
Where unrelated to the trial issues or a witnesses' ability to per-
ceive and testify, a motion in liminie can prevent the introduction
of these prejudicial distractions. In the civil case of Doyle v. City
of New York,28 counsel moved to exclude that part of a hospital
record which attributed a drug and alcohol history to the plaintiff
and was based solely on hearsay. Though the motion was pre-
sumably made at trial and not "in liminie," the reviewing court
held that the judge's refusal to grant the proper motion coupled
with opposing counsel's continued prejudicial insinuations about
the plaintiff's supposed status constituted reversible error.
2. Marital, economic, or health status-In State v. Flett,21 the
trial court committed no error in refusing to grant the defendant's
motion to prevent testimony on her marital indiscretions from
being heard by the jury, where she was charged with killing her
husband. However, when the district attorney proved remote
acts of indiscretion unrelated to the murder issue, the conviction
was reversed.
8. Military release status-State v. Smith,30 reports the earliest
successful use of a motion in liminie at trial in a criminal case.
Just after the defendant had completed his direct testimony on
the stand, but before cross-examination had begun, defense
counsel informed the court in the absence of the jury that the
defendant had received a less than honorable discharge from the
Marine Corps. Stating that he believed the prosecutor improperly
intended to examine the defendant about that fact, counsel then
moved that the court direct the state to make an offer of proof
thereon outside the presence of the jury if that line of questioning
was to be pursued. The court so ordered after argument. The
27 56 A.2d 522 (Conn. 1947).
28 119 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1953).
20 380 P.2d 634 (Ore. 1963); Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1082 (1963).
30 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937).
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jury was allowed to return and without making any offer the
prosecutor proceeded to ask a question which elicited the for-
bidden information. Defense counsel did not object, move to
strike, or request a jury instruction to disregard. On appeal
with five of nine judges concurring in the result, the court stated:
In propounding the question, counsel clearly violated the
ruling of the court theretofore made. The question was highly
prejudicial and of such a nature that the prejudice largely
consists in the mere asking of the question. The fact that the
question was not objected to is not controlling. It may well be
that an objection to such a question, even though sustained,
is more damaging to a defendant's case than almost any
answer could be. Neither under the circumstances shown by
this record was a motion to strike the answer and instruct
the jury to disregard the same necessary. In any event, in
view of the deliberate disregard by counsel, of the court's
ruling, prejudice must be presumed, and appellants motion
for a new trial should have been granted.31
4. Race, religion-Motions in liminie in this area might be co-
ordinated with other procedural techniques recommended by
Charles R. Garry.2
C. Criminal Involvement of Defendant or Witnesses
To the extent that they are not related to the offense on trial,
demonstrative of a common scheme, design, technique or pattern
of crime, or reflective of a witness's ability to perceive and
recollect, the following might also be attacked by motion in
liminie.
1. Arrests not resulting in conviction-In a grand larceny trial,
State v. Morgan,33 the defense attorney requested outside the
jury's presence that the prosecutor be required to advise the court
in advance as to any questions which he intended to ask or
testimony which he intended to offer relating to the defendant's
previous arrests. Especially where counsel's request was very
vague, indefinite and general in nature, a denial of the motion
31 Id. at 1078.
32 Mr. Garry's recommendations appear in the 1969 National Lawyers Guild
publication, Min IMnVIG RACISm w" Jury TIAL.
3373 P.2d 745 (Wash. 1937).
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in advance of the actual offering of the evidence at trial was held
to be within the sound discretion of the judge.
2. Felony charges upon which no true bill is returned-In a
Texas case, Padgett v. State,3 4 the prosecutor produced testimony
which tended to implicate the defendant in crimes more serious
than the intoxicating driving with which he was charged. Despite
the fact that the court ruled before trial upon a motion in liminie
that no allusions to any matter upon which the defendant was not
indicted or convicted should be made at trial, the state's acts
were harmless error when the defense attorney revealed to the
trial jurors that a grand jury had refused to return a true bill on
the other offenses.
3. Indictments pending against a witness-No error was
found where the state obtained an order by pretrial motion in
liminie prohibiting defense counsel from asking a state witness
any questions about federal indictments pending against him,
without first approaching the subject outside of the jury's hearing.
The defense counsel conducted an examination before the court
alone as to promises of aid and assistance on the federal case
by the state district attorney in exchange for his testimony
against the defendant. When the witness denied all allegations,
the topics discussed in the examination were held properly kept
from the jury's attention in Scarborough v. State.:5
4. Prior convictions-A motion in liminie to prevent the rais-
ing of a conviction so remote in time (7 years and 3 months) as to
be unenlightening and prejudicial was rejected in Arrington v.
State.36 In United States v. Palumbo,3 7 the defendant advised the
trial c6urt of five earlier convictions and requested an order
preventing the prosecutor's use of them at trial arguing that they
were unrelated to credibility and too remote in time. When the
court ruled that his prior record would be admissible, the defen-
dant elected not to take the stand. The United States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, in affrming the conviction, stated that
a judge might prevent prior conviction testimony if he finds that
84 864 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1963).
35 344 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1961).
36 296 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1956).
37 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968).
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a substantial chance of unfair prejudice outweighs a slight reflec-
tion on the defendant's credibility.
A county court in State v. Hawthorne,8 concluded that the
suppression of remote convictions was proper and that a motion
in liminie before trial was the preferable mode of raising the issue.
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in the same case309
disagreed. Rejecting the earlier view that the New Jersey
statutory scheme permitted the discretionary rejection of such
testimony, the court stated that evidence of prior convictions
could not be subject to an objection determined in advance of
trial. However, the appellate court did recognize that under
some circumstances a motion in liminie might be directed at a
judge's discretion before trial, although the alternative procedure
of simply discussing an offer of proof after dismissing the jury
was the ordinary and desirable practice.
5. Prior payment of fine, forfeiture of bond.
6. Prior similar criminal acts-In Johns v. State,40 the de-
fendant offered a pretrial motion to preclude the state from
offering evidence of any acts of intercourse occurring prior to the
incident of statutory rape on trial. The court held that a trial
judge properly refused to rule on the motion, because he had no
way of knowing whether the evidence would be admissable at
trial. The court also felt that the state had the right to prove its
case in any manner which was proper under the rules of trial, and
that the defendant should not be allowed to control the manner
or method of proof made by the prosecution. The Oregon
Supreme Court in State v. Flett,41 held that the denial of a motion
in liminie which sought to prevent evidence of prior adulterous
contacts was within the trial court's discretion, but reversed a
murder conviction when the state went too far in proving remote
acts of marital indiscretion unrelated to the crime on trial.
D. Events Contemporaneous in Time With the Crime Charged
1. Acts related in time, but not part of the res gestae-Johns v.
State,42 on the ground that evidentiary evaluations could not
38 218 A.2d 430 (N.J. 1966).
39 228 A.2d 682 (N.J. 1967).
40 236 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1951).
41380 P.2d 634 (Ore. 1963).
42 286 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1951).
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properly be made before trial and that other acts were inseparable
from the crime charged, held that a motion in liminie seeking
to prevent the admission of evidence of acts of perversion not
part of the statutory rape res gestae was properly denied.
2. Acts of persons other than the defendant-Counsel might
be able to shield his defendant from trial references to acts with
prejudicial overtones committed by other perpetrators through a
properly drawn motion in liminie.
3. Acts committed upon persons not the complainant in the
charge on trial-The defendant in Bills v. State,4" was charged
with committing sodomy upon a young boy. The Texas court
denied his pretrial motion to prevent testimony about similar acts
perpetrated upon two other boys at the same time. A majority
of the appellate court found no reversible error, as the acts were
all bound into the res gestae of the crime, and as the court felt
that a motion in Jimnie was not the proper mode of seeking
exclusion in this instance.
E. Tangible Evidence
1. Property unrelated to the crime charged but found on the
defendant's person-In Arrington v. State, 44 defendant moved in
liminie to exclude tools, shotgun, shells, and miscellaneous items
found in the trunk of his car but not listed in the indictment upon
which he was being tried. He urged that such evidence prejudiced
him by giving the jury an impression that he was a thief "gen-
erally." The Texas court held no error flowed from the denial of
the request, as the "motion to suppress" is not recognized in
Texas criminal procedure, and as the defendant did not request a
motion to strike or any curative jury instructions.
Although Gasaway v. State,45 concerned a motion to suppress
based on an illegal search, instead of a true motion in liminie, it is
instructive on the prejudicial aspects of tangible evidence. The
defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained in an
automobile search by police was denied. At trial the defense
unsuccessfully objected to certain oral testimony and to the phy-
sical display of the contested articles on a table in front of the
43327 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1959).
44296 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. 1956).
45 231 N.E.2d 513 (Ind. 1967).
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jury. Later during the trial, the court reversed itself suppressing
the tangible evidence, but allowing the case to go to the jury
without the curative instructions requested by the defendant.
Reversing the conviction and remanding for a new trial, the
Supreme Court held that the consideration of such matters at a
pretrial hearing was much preferable to the unsatisfactory situa-
tion which had developed in front of the jury.
2. Property not connected to the defendant-In State v. Sch-
leicher,46 the Missouri court said in dicta that on a proper pre-
trial motion stolen property which had no demonstrated con-
nection with a particular defendant should be excluded as evi-
dence against him in any later trial.
3. Incomplete evidence-The Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York in United States v. Fishel,47 con-
sidered a situation in which two or three separate tape recordings
of the defendant's alleged bribery attempt conversations had been
misplaced. The defendant moved in liminie to prevent the gov-
ernment from placing the one remaining tape into evidence at
trial. Agreeing that the jury was likely to be prejudiced against
arguments urging an entrapment defense if they were permitted
to hear only the remaining tape, the court felt compelled to
exclude the evidence to preserve the defendant's right to a fair
trial.
4. Hearsay evidence-That portion of a hospital record based
on hearsay statements about a plaintiff's history of alcoholism
and drug addiction was prejudicially admitted over defendant's
motion in the civil case of Doyle v. City of New York.48
5. Statements of the defendant or a witness-An attempt by
pretrial motion to exclude statements made by the defendant to
police and an assistant prosecutor was rejected in People v.
Simpkins,49 where no constitutional issues of illegal search and
seizure or voluntariness were raised.
F. Procedural Events
1. To prevent the calling of certain witnesses-Whan v.
46 438 S.W.2d 258 (Mo. 1969).
47 324 F.Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
48119 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1953).
49 243 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1963).
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State"0 was a murder prosecution in which the defense requested
that the victim's wife be called and examined first outside the
presence of the jury. The defendant argued that he should be
spared the prejudice and sympathy that the woman's crippled
condition and inability to walk unassisted would create if she
proved to have no material and relevant testimony. Despite
counsel's contentions that she did not witness the crime and her
presence could only inflame the jury, the reviewing court held
that the motion was properly denied where she identified three
of the decedent's personal belongings. A concurring judge felt
this testimony was "irrelevant, immaterial, and possibly inflama-
tory" but insuffcient alone to require a reversal of the conviction.
In Ortega v. State,51 the Texas trial court's refusal to grant a
motion to exclude certain witness testimony or to limit the num-
ber of witnesses against the defendant at the punishment stage
of trial, was proper where the court also prevented the jury from
hearing any reference to other offenses committed by the accused.
2. To prevent any reference to press publicized matters-An
unofficial report of Huff v. N. Y. Cent. R.R.,52 states that the court
made a pretrial order prohibiting counsel for either party from
mentioning during trial any of certain extraneous matters that
had received great publicity in the media and were potentially
prejudicial to the defendant.
3. To exclude the public from trial on motion-Where the
defendant believes that the presence of the public press reporting
of the evidence adduced might have a coercive effect on the jury
or otherwise hamper his right to a fair trial, a motion in liminie
waiving the constitutional right to a public trial and requesting
a closed hearing should be proper.
4. To permit the employment of unusual tactics-Requesting
court control and advice to permit unusual but necessary pro-
cedures while minimizing the chance of mistrial or reversal, is
the proper scope of the "permissive" motion in liminie.
VIII. THE EFFEcT OF GRANTING OR DENYING TIM MOTION
The courts are also divided about the procedural effects of a
50488 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1969).
51462 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. 1970).
52 186 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio 1961); discussed in 12 DEFENSE L.J. 810 (1963).
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motion in liminie. It is clear, however, that regardless of whether
a motion in liminie is made or not made, granted or denied,
worded too broadly or too narrowly, a timely and specific trial
objection will preserve any evidentiary issue for appeal. But
where a party fails to make either a pretrial or at-trial objection
to certain evidence he may be deemed to have waived the right to
object.53 If a "preliminary" order has been granted, then opposing
counsel has the right to attempt to bring in the excluded
evidence, so long as he makes his offer before the court alone.
If the order which has been granted is in "absolute" form, then
counsel may not offer or allude to the evidence in any manner
during trial. When either type of motion in liminie is granted
it may be reversible error for the court to disregard its own
order and to permit reference to or introduction of the excluded
evidence in the jury's presence. 4 The presentation of excluded
matters to the jury directly, by suggestion, by the wording of a
question, or other indirection is a violation of professional legal
standards.65
Under one view the judge must take such affirmative action
on his own initiative as is necessary to preserve the effect of his
pretrial ruling. 6 Another view suggests that it is incumbent upon
the movant to object at trial if the opposing party attempts to
obviate the order.5 7 In some circumstances a court may overrule
the pretrial exclusionary order and permit the objectionable mat-
ter into evidence at trial.58 Counsel must also be careful that he
does not waive his objections or cure reversible error by elicting
testimony or producing evidence which eliminates the prejudice
created by the violation of the court order. 9 The attorney may
also open the door to admitting evidence excluded by pretrial
order if he himself makes any remarks alluding to the missing
evidence and thereby creates the counter-prejudicial impression
that the opposition may be hiding evidence.6 0
Should it become apparent during trial that opposing counsel
53 Henry v. State, 198 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1967).
54State v. Smith, 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937).
5 Burdick v. York Oil Company, 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1963).
56 Id. at 770.
57 Padgett v. State, 364 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1963).
58 Id. at 400.
59 Id.
60 United States v. Fishel, 324 F.Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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is attempting to touch upon the forbidden subjects in the jury's
presence, the soundest tactic is for counsel to approach the bench
and object on the record but out of the jury's hearing. By
protesting immediately and requesting that the offending attorney
be admonished, counsel not only preserves the maximum effect
of his pretrial order, but also insures his rights on appeal. If it
becomes apparent that evidence excluded by an absolute pretrial
order has become legally relevant and material, counsel should
evaluate the desirability of requesting that the court reverse itself
to prevent the possibility of built-in reversible error on appeal for
the opposition. This procedure is not necessary if counsel has had
a preliminary form of motion granted, as the opposition is re-
quired to take the initiative to re-offer the evidence at trial and
has no automatic error.
The denial of a motion in liminie of either prohibitive type
forces counsel to object at trial when the opponent again begins
to refer to the prejudicial material. This objection, too, should
be made unobstrusively and immediately at the bench on the
record, but in a voice inaudible to those in the jury box. Courts
have suggested that the attorney whose motion in liminie has
been denied should not be required to object at trial to preserve
his rights on appeal."' However, counsel ordinarily cannot afford
to remain silent and take the risk that an appellate court will rule
that a renewal of his objection was required to avoid waiving the
issue of prejudice on appeal. 2 Objections should be entered at
appropriate opportunities as necessary to preserve the record
while drawing as little jury attention to the sensitive subject as
possible.
IX. DISADVANTAGES OF MoI-oNs IN LmaNm
The practice of employing motions in liminie is not without
some drawbacks. It can be argued that the pretrial consideration
of evidence questions makes efficient and just criminal adjudica-
tion more difficult. First, rulings in liminie can never be totally
accurate in balancing the probative and prejudicial values of a
piece of evidence which is best evaluated in the total trial context.
The criminal trial becomes more "piecemeal" because of an in-
61 State v. Smith, 65 P.2d 1075 (Wash. 1937).
62 Jackson v. State, 133 S.E.2d 436 (Ga. 1963).
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crease in the number of separate issues being considered at
different times. This may lead to an increase in the overall time
required to try a given case, where evidentiary issues that may
not even arise at trial are given extensive pretrial scrutiny. In
cases where the court's pretrial ruling was improper and pre-
vented an attorney from developing evidence which later became
material and relevant, the absolute motion in liminie may lead
to built-in error and an increase of new trials on appeal.
The use of motions in liminie also present some minor conflicts
with various theoretical concepts of criminal justice administra-
tion. To decide certain prejudicial questions in advance, the court
may be required to assume that an attorney would try to present
illegal, incompetent, and irrelevant material to a jury in an in-
flamatory manner. The juristically-innovated motion in liminie
may be regarded as a judicial encroachment on the power of the
legislature in certain states where it is not found within a com-
prehensive and express statutory delineation of pretrial pro-
cedures. The revealing of sensitive matters of the opposition's
evidence well before trial could lead to fraud in the fabrication
of countering testimony.
Finally, the attorney himself should have some second thoughts
about the motion. Counsel's indiscriminate use of the technique
could damage his own case by suggesting proof that opposing
counsel had not considered. If the attorney does not then prevail
on his motion he has only succeeded in strengthening the case
against himself. By relying on novel rather than tested pro-
cedures, counsel may suffer an inadvertent forfeiture of his client's
right through minor oversights or unfavorable appellate review.
X. ADVANTAGES OF MOTIONS IN Lnnmi
The advantages of motion in liminie practice are significant
and persuasive. The pretrial consideration of prejudicial evidence
problems speeds, simplifies, and purifies the process of obtaining
just criminal verdicts. As the trend favoring other pretrial dis-
covery and proceedings suggests, the concept of a bifurcated
trial may save time overall by minimizing the consideration of
collateral issues and preventing extensive delays during trial.
Thus, during trial both judge and jury are able to concentrate
upon the main dispute. Because it refines the actual trial issues
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and prevents the parading of prejudice before the jury, a motion
in liminie might also cut overall judicial involvement by elimi-
nating a significant number of reversible error situations which
might otherwise compel mistrials and new trials on appeal. Any
increase in the time spent on an individual case may be well
invested as it could mean a more careful consideration of com-
plex issues.
Perhaps more importantly, the pretrial ruling replaces the
ineffective, unrealistic and psychologically invalid admonitions
to the jury. It offers a simple and completely efficacious method
of preserving fair trials by isolating the jury from prejudicial
inferences. The motion in liminie takes account of human nature
and basic psychology. It assumes that a fair trial should not be
sacrificed to empty formalism. Because a party is not required
to object to the airing of evidence which seems logically relevant
to the jurors, he does not suffer from appearing to be hiding the
truth. Counsel is not forced to choose between permitting a
prejudice to be planted by opposing counsel or stimulating it by
his own objections. If granted, a motion in liminie preserves
judicial fairness even as to those issues of prejudice which may
not amount to reversible error because it keeps minor as well
as major improprieties from being considered by the jury. Where
the motion in liminie is used, every party can obtain a better idea
of the sensitive aspect of testimony that may be offered against
him and can better prepare to place it in proper perspective by
introducing countering evidence. If a motion in liminie is used,
counsel is better able to describe the extent to which prejudice
may have influenced the outcome because he has formal pretrial
proceedings, as well as the trial record, from which to document
his allegations. Thus, the motion in liminie can do much to
enhance the quality of justice in both trial and appellate courts.
The motion in liminie will be an effective device for removing
the spectre of prejudice from the jury box if criminal practitioners
will encourage its appropriate use and orderly development.
APPENDIX
Form 1. Prohibitive Absolute Motion in Liminie
COMES NOW THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN THE ABOVE
ENTITLED CASE AND MOVES THE COURT IN LIMINIE for
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an order instructing the Defendant to refrain absolutely from making
any direct or indirect reference whatsoever in person, by counsel, or
through witnesses, to the specified evidence or defenses on the
following grounds:
1. The case has now been set for trial.
2. According to the indictment the trial will involve a determina-
tion of these basic issues:
3. The State is informed, believes and hence alleges that at said
trial the Defendant will attempt to introduce evidence, make
reference to, or otherwise leave the jury with the impression
that....
4. It is immaterial and unnecessary to the disposition of this case
and contrary to the defenses recognized by law in this state
to permit such evidence or inference and would be highly
prejudicial to the State in the minds of the jury in that ....
5. An ordinary objection during the course cf trial even if sus-
tained with proper instructions to the jury will not remove such
effect in view of ....
WHEREFORE THE STATE PRAYS this Court to exercise its
discretion and make an order ABSOLUTELY PROHIBITING said
offer, or reference.
Form 2. Prohibitive Preliminary Motion in Liminie
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT IN THE ABOVE EN-
TITLED CASE AND MOVES THE COURT IN LIMINIE for an
order instructing the District Attorney, his representatives and wit-
nesses to refrain from making any direct or indirect mention what-
soever at trial before the jury of the matters hereinafter set forth
without first obtaining permission from the Court outside the presence
and hearing of the jury.
This Motion is made upon the following grounds:
1. The case has now been set for trial.
2. According to the indictment the trial will involve a determina-
tion of these basic issues:
3. The Defendant is informed, believes and hence alleges that at
said trial the State will attempt to introduce evidence, make
reference to, or otherwise leave the jury with the impression
that ....
4. It is immaterial and unnecessary to the disposition of this case
and contrary to the law of this state to permit such evidence
or inference and would be highly prejudicial to the State in the
minds of the jury in that ....
5. An ordinary objection during the course of trial even if sus-
tained with proper instructions to the jury will not remove such
effect in view of ....
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WHEREFORE THE DEFENDANT PRAYS that the Court exer-
cise its inherent power over the conduct of trials and order the District
Attorney not to elicit testimony respecting, mentioning, or referring
to the above matters without securing prior clearance from the Court.
Form 3. Permissive Motion in Liminie
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED
CASE AND MOVES THE COURT FOR AN ORDER IN LIMINIE
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR AN ORDER SEVERING TRIALS.
This Motion is made upon the following grounds:
1. The case has now been set for a joint trial of two defendants.
2. This Defendant has pled not guilty and intends to take the
stand at trial, but the co-defendant has a long criminal record
and it is anticipated that he will invoke his privilege against
self-incrimination.
3. To help avoid any such prejudicial speculation as the jurors
might make, this Defendant intends to comment upon the co-
defendant's failure to take the stand.
WHEREFORE the Court is requested to rule in liminie if the
Defendant will be permitted to use the stated procedure, and under
what conditions, OR in the alternative is requested to sever the two
trials to avoid undue prejudice in the minds of the jurors to either
Defendant.
